The belief that "one IS a woman" 1s almost as absurd and obscurantist as the belief that "one IS a man"
[Wje must use "we are women" as an advertisement or slogan for our demands. On a deeper level, however, a woman cannot "be"; it IS something whlch does not even belong In the order of bemg. (Quoted In Marks and de Courtivron 1981, 137) In the same interview, she also says that, because of the very different history of Chnese women, "it is absurd to question thelr lack of 'sexual liberat~on' " (in Marks and de Courtivron 1981, 140) . Clearly, she thinks we could have no cross-cultural explanations of or objections to gender inequality.
Spelman argues that "the phrase 'as a woman' 1s the Trojan horse of feminist ethnocentr~sm" (IW, 13). The great mistakes of wh~te middle-class femin~sts have been to exclude women different from themselves from theu cntiques or, even when they are ~ncluded, to assume that, whatever the~r differences, thelr experience of sexism 1s the same. At best, she says, what is presented 1s "[aln additive analysis [whlch] treats the oppression of a black woman In a society that is raclst as well as sexlst as if it were a further burden when in fact it is a different burden" (IW, 123; emphasis added) .
These antlessent~alist arguments, however, are often long on theory and very short on empirical evldence. A large proportion of Spelman's examples of how women's experiences of oppression are different are taken from periods of slavery In anclent Greece and, especially, in the pre-Civil War South. It is not clear, though, how relevant is the obvious contrast between the expenence of wh~te slaveholders' wlves and black female slaves to most issues lnvolvlng the sameness or difference of forms of gender oppression today.
Apart from the pauclty of relevant ev~dence (which I shall return to), there seem to me to be two other related problems with Spelman's general antiessentialist argument. One is the clalm that unless a feminist theorlst perceives gender ldent~ty as intrinsically bound up wlth class, race, or other aspects of identity she lgnores the effects of these other differences altogether. Spelman writes, "If gender were lsolatable from other forms of identity, if sexlsm were lsolatable from other forms of oppression, then what would be true about the relation between any man and any woman would be true about the relation between any other man and any other woman" (IW, 81) . But this does not follow at all. One can argue that sexlsm is an identifiable form of oppression, many of whose effects are felt by women regardless of race or class, without at all subscribing to the vlew that race and class oppression are ~nsignificant. One can still insist, for example, on the slgnlficant difference between the relation of a poor black woman to a wealthy whlte man and that of a wealthy white woman to a poor black man.
The second problem is that Spelman rmsplaces the burden of proof, whch presumably affects her perception of the need for her to produce evldence for her clams. She says, "Preclsely Insofar as a discussion of gender and gender relations 1s really, even if obscurely, about a particular group of women and theu relation to a particular group of men, ~t 1s unlikely to be applicable to any other group of women" (IN', 114). But why7 Surely the burden of proof is on the critic. To be convincing, she needs to show that and how the theory accused of essentialism omlts or distorts the experlence of persons other than those few the theonst allegedly does take account of. Thls, after all, 1s the burden that many of the femlnlsts Spelman considers "essentialist" have themselves taken on In crlt~qulng "malestream" theones. One of the problems of antlessent~alist fermnlsm (shared, I thlnk, wlth much of postmodernlst cntlque) is that ~t tends to substitute the cry "We're all different" for both argument and evldence.
There are, however, exceptions, and they tend to come from femlnlsts who belong to racial rmnorltles. One of the best critiques of femlnlst essentialism that I know of 1s that by Angela Hams (1990) , in whlch she shows how ignorance of the specifics of a culture mars even thoroughly well-lntentloned femlnlst analyses of women's experiences of oppression wlthln that culture. She argues, for example, that In some respects, black women In the Unlted States have had a qualitatively rather than slrnply quantitatively different expenence of rape than that of whlte women (see esp. 594, 598-601). Even here, though, I thlnk the antiessentlalist crltlque 1s only partly convlnclng. Although more concerned wlth evldence for the salience of differences than most antlessentlalists seem to be, Harrls ralses far more emplrlcal questions than she provldes answers. She provldes just one example to support her assertion that black women's experlence of rape IS, even now, radically different from that of whlte women-that ~t 1s "an experlence as deeply rooted In color as In gender" (p. 598).4 Yet she, like Spelman, 1s as much disturbed by whlte femlnlsts' saylng that black women are "just like us only more so" as she 1s by thelr marglnalizlng black women or lgnorlng them altogether. As I shall argue, t h~s "insult[ing]" conclus~on-that the problems of other women are "slmilar to ours but more so"-1s exactly the one I reach when I apply some Western fermnlst Ideas about justice to the sltuatlons of poor women In many poor countnes.
In thls essay, I put ant~essentlalist femlnlsm to what I thlnk 1s a reasonably tough test. In dolng th~s, I am talung up the gauntlet that Spelman throws down. She says, referring to the body of new work about women that has appeared In many fields, Rather than assumlng that women have something In common as women, these researchers should help us look to see whether they do.
Rather Triuned as a philosopher, she does not seem to consider it appropriate to take up the challenge of actually looklng at some of t h s empuical evidence. Having s a d the above, she turns back to discussing Plato. Trained as a political scientist, I shall attempt to look at some comparative evidence. I'll put some Western femlnist ideas about justice and inequality to the test (drawing on my recent book and the many femlnlst sources I use to support some of its arguments) by seeing how well these theones--developed in the context of women In well-off Western industrialized countries-work when used to look at the very different situations of some of the poorest women In poor countries. How do our accounts and our explanations of gender lnequality stand up In the face of considerable cultural and socioeconomic difference?
DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES IN GENDER OPPRESSION: POOR WOMEN IN POOR COUNTRIES
Does the assumption "that there 1s a generalizable, identifiable and collectively shared expenence of womanhood" (Benhabib and Cornell 1987, 13 ) have any validity, or 1s it indeed an essentialist myth, nghtly challenged by Thlrd World women and thelr spokesfemlnlsts? Do the theorles devised by First World feminists, particularly our critiques of nonfermnist theorles of justice, have anythng to say, in particular, to the poorest women In poor countries, or to those policymakers with the potential to affect their lives for better or for worse?
In trylng to answer these questions, I shall address, In turn, four sets of Issues, whlch have been addressed both by recent feminist crltics of AngloAmerican soclal and political theory and by those development scholars who have In recent years concerned themselves wlth the neglect or distortion of the situation of women in the countries they study. First, why and how has the lssue of the Inequality between the sexes been ignored or obscured for so long and addressed only so recently? Second, why 1s ~t so important that ~t be addressed? Thlrd, what do we find, when we subject households or families to standards ofjustice-when we look at the largely hldden ~nequal-ities between the sexes? And finally, what are the policy implications of these findings?
Why Attention to Gender Is Comparatively New
In both development studies and theorles of justice, there has, until recently, been a marked lack of attention to gender-and In particular to systematic ~nequalit~es polnt has been made about between the sexes. T h~s theones of justice throughout the 1980s (e.g., Kearns 1983; O k~n 1989b; Crossthwalte 1989) . In the development literature, ~t was first made earlier, in ploneerlng work by Ester Boserup, but has lately been heard loud and strong from a number of other prominent development theorists (Chen 1983; Dasgupta 1993; Sen 1990a Sen , 1990b Jelin 1990 ). In both contexts, the neglect of women and gender seems to be due pr~marily to two factors. The first 1s the assumption that the household (usually assumed to be male-headed) is the appropnate unit of analysis. The dichotomy between the public (political and economic) and the private (domest~c and personal) IS assumed valid, and only the former has been taken to be the appropnate sphere for development studies and theones of justlce, respectively, to attend to. In ethical and political theor~es, the family is often regarded as an Inappropriate context for justlce, slnce love, altru~sm, or shared interests are assumed to hold sway w~t h~nAlternatively, ~t IS sometimes taken for granted that ~t IS a realm of ~t .
hierarchy and injustice. (Occas~onal theorists, IikeRousseau, have s a~d both!) In economics, development and other, households until recently have simply been taken for granted as the appropriate u n~t of analys~s on such questions as Income distribution. The publiclpnvate dichotomy and the assumption of the male-headed household have many serlous ~mplications for women as well as for children that are discussed below (Dasgupta 1993; Jaquette 1982, 283; Okin 1989b, 10-14, 124-33; Olsen 1983; Pateman 1983) .
The second factor IS the closely related failure to disaggregate data or arguments by sex. In the development literature, it seems to appear s~mply in thls form (Chen, Huq, and D'Souza 1981, 68; Jaquette 1982, 283-84) . In the justlce literature, t h~s used to be obscured by the use of male pronouns and other referents. Of late, the (rather more ~nsidious) practlce that I have called "false gender neutrality" has appeared. Ttus conslsts In the use of gender-neutral terms ("he or she," "persons," and so on), when the polnt belng made IS slmply Invalid or otherwise false ~f one actually applies ~t to women (Ohn 1989b, esp. 10-13, 45) . But the effect IS the same In both literatures; women are not taken Into account, so the inequalities between the sexes are obscured.
The public/domestic dichotomy has serious implications for women. It not only obscures ~ntrahousehold lnequalit~es of resources and power, as I discuss below, but ~t also results in the failure to count a great deal of the work done by women as work, slnce all that I S cons~dered "work" IS what IS done for pay in the "public" sphere. All of the work that women do In bearlng and reanng children, cleanlng and malntalnlng households, carlng for the old and slck, and contributing in varlous ways to men's work does not count as work. Thls 1s clearly one of those Instances I n whch the situation of poor women In poor countrles 1s not qualitat~vely different from that of most women in nch countries but, rather, "slmilar but worse," for even more, In some cases far more, of the work done by women (and children) in poor countrles is rendered invisible, not counted, or "subsumed under men's work." The work of subsistence f a m n g , tending to anlmals, domestic crafts (if not for the market), and the often arduous fetching of water and fuel are all added to the category of unrecognized work of women that already exists in rlcher c~u n t n e s .~ Chen notes that women who do all these things "are listed [by policymakers] as housewives," even though "their tasks are as critical to the wellbeing of theu families and to national production as are the men's" (Chen 1983, 220 ; see also Dasgupta 1993; Drbze and Sen 1989, chap. 4; Jaquette 1982, clting Bourgue and Warren 1979; Waring 1989) .
Why Does It Matter?
This may seem like a silly question. Indeed, I hope ~t will soon be unnecessary, but it ~sn't-yet. I therefore argue, at the outset of Justice, Gendec and the Family, that the omss~on from theorles of justice of gender, and of much of women's lives, IS significant for three major reasons. Each of these reasons applies at least as much to the neglect of gender in theorles of development. The first is obvious: women matter (at least they do to feminists), and their well-being matters at least as much as that of men. As scholars of development have recently been malung clear, the inequalities between the sexes In a number of poor countries have not only highly detrimental but fatal consequences for millions of women. Sen (1990a) has recently argued that as many as one hundred million fewer women exist than mlght normally be expected on the bass of malelfemale mortality rates In societies less devaluing of women-not only the Western lndustnalized world but much of sub-Saharan Afnca, too (see also Dasgupta 1993; Drbze and Sen 1989, chap. 4; Drkze and Sen 1990, Introduction, 11-14; but cf. Harrlss 1990; Wheeler and Abdullah 1988) . So here too we can reasonably say that the lssue of the neglect of women is "similar but much worse."
The second reason I have ralsed (in the U.S. context) for the necessity for femlnlst cntique of theories of soclal justice is that equality of opportunityfor women and glrls-but also for increasing numbers of boys-is much affected by the failure of theorles ofjustlce to address gender inequality. Thls IS In part due to the greater extent of economlc distress In female-headed households. In the Unlted States, nearly 25 percent of children are belng rased In slngle female-headed households, and three-fifths of all chronically poor households w~t h children are among those supported by slngle women. It has been recently estimated that throughout the world one-thlrd of households are headed by slngle females, w~t h the percentage much hlgher In reglons w~t h significant male out-mlgrat~on (Chen 1983 .221, Jaquette 1982 . Many millions of children are affected by the hlgher rate of poverty among such farnilie~.~ Theories of justice or of economlc development that fail to pay attention to gender Ignore th~s, too.
In addit~on, the gendered divlsion of labor has a senous and direct impact on the opportunltles of guls and women, whlch crosses the lines of econormc class. The opportunltles of females are s~gn~ficantly affected by the structures and practices of family life, particularly by the fact that women are almost Invanably prlmary caretakers, wh~ch has much Impact on thelr availability for full-time wage work. It also results In the~r frequently belng overworked, and renders them less likely than men to be cons~dered economically valuable. T h s factor, too, operates "similarly but more so" wlthln poor families In many poor countrles. There, too, adult women suffer--often more severely-many of the same effects of the divis~on of labor as do women In r~cher countrles. But, In addit~on, theu daughters are likely to be put to work for the household at a very young age, are much less likely to be educated and to attan literacy than are sons of the same households and, worst of all-less valued than theu brothers-they have less chance of stay~ng alive because they are more likely to be deprlved of food or of health care (Dasgupta 1993; Dreze and Sen 1990, chap. 4; Sen 1990a; Papanek 1990) .
Thlrd, I have argued that the failure to address the Issue ofjust distribution w~thln households IS s~gnificant because the family IS the first, and arguably the most ~nfluential, school of moral development (Okrn 1989b, esp. 17-23) . It IS the first env~ronment In whlch we expenence how persons treat each other, In whlch we have the potentla1 to learn how to be just or unjust. If children see that sex difference 1s the occaslon for obv~ously differentlal treatment, they are surely likely to be affected In theu personal and moral development. They are likely to learn ~njust~ce by absorbing the messages, if male, that they have some klnd of "natural" enhanced entitlement and, if female, that they are not equals and had better get used to being subordinated ~f not actually abused. So far as I know, this po~nt was first made In the Western context by John Stuart Mill, who wrote of the "perverting influence" of the typlcal English family of h~s time-wh~ch he termed "a school of despotism" (Mill [I8691 1988, 88) . I have argued that the still remaining unequal distribution of benefits and burdens between most parents In two-parent heterosexual families IS likely to affect thelr children's developing sense of justice (Olun 1989b, e.g., 21-23, 97-101) . In the context of poor countries, as Papanek (1990) notes, "Domestic groups in which age and gender difference confer power on some over others are poor environments In whlch to unlearn the nornis of inequality" @p. 163-65). She also notes that "glven the persistence of gender-based inequalities in power, authority, and access to resources, one must conclude that socialization for gender inequality is by and large very successful" (p. 170). When such basic goods as food and health care are unequally distributed to young children according to sex, a very strong slgnal about the acceptability of injustice 1s surely conferred. The comparison of most families i n rich countries wlth poor families In poor countries-where distinctions between the sexes often start earlier and are much more blatant and more harmful to glrls-yields, here too, the concluslon that, in the latter case, thlngs are not so much different as "similar but more so." Many Thlrd World families, it seems, are even worse schools of justice and more successful inculcators of the Inequality of the sexes as natural and appropnate than are their developed world equivalents. Thus there IS even more need for attention to be paid to gender inequality In the former context than in the latter.
Justice m the Family
What do we find when we compare some of Anglo-American feminists' findings about justlce wlthin households In thelr societies wlth recent discovenes about distributions of benefits and burdens I n poor households In poor countries? Agaln, In many respects, the injustices of gender are quite slmilar.
In both situations, women's access to paid work is constraned both by discrimnatlon and sex segregation In the workplace and by the assumption that women are "naturally" responsible for all or most of the unprud work of the household (Bergmann 1986; Fuchs 1988; Gerson 1985; Olun 1989b, 147-52, 155-56; Sanday 1974) . In both situations, women typically work longer total hours than men:
Tim-use statistics considenng all work (paid and unpiud econormc activity and unprud housework) reveal that women spend more of theu time worhng than men in all developed and developing regions except northern Amenca and Australia, where the hours are almost equal. (United Nations Report 1991, 81 and chap. 6 passlrn; see also Bergmann 1986; Hochschild 1989) In both situations, developed and less developed, vastly more of women's work is not paid and IS not considered "prod~ctive."Thus there IS a w~d e gap between men's and women's recorded economlc partlclpatlon. The perception that women's work 1s of less worth (desp~te the fact that In most places they do more, and ~t IS cruc~al to the survlval of household members) contributes to women's belng devalued and havlng less power both wlthln the family and outslde the household (Blumsteln and Schwartz 1983; Dasgupta 1993; Drbze and Sen 1990, chap. 4; Okln 1989b, chap. 7; Sanday 1974; Sen 1990a Sen , 1990b ). T h s In turn adversely affects the~r capac~ty to become econom~cally less dependent on men. Thus they become lnvolved In "a cycle of socially caused and distinctly asymrnetnc vulnerability" (Okln 1989b, 138; Drkze and Sen 1989,56-59) . The devaluat~on of women's work, as well as then lesser phys~cal strength and economlc dependence on men, allows them to be subject to phys~cal, sexual, and/or psycholog~cal abuse by men they live w~t h (Gordon 1988; Un~ted Natlons Report 1991, 19-20) . However, In many poor countries, as I have mentioned, thls power different~a l extends beyond the abuse and overworkof women to depr~vat~on In terms of the feeding, health care, and education of female children-and even to the~r be~ng born or not: "of 8,000 abortions In Bombay after parents learned the sex of the foetus through amniocentesis, only one would have been a boy" (Un~ted Nations Report 1991, see also Dasgupta 1993; D r h e and Sen 1989, chap. 4; Sen 1990a) .
In cross-reg~onal analyses, both Sen and Dasgupta havefoundcorrelat~ons between the life expectancies of females relative to males and the extent to whlch women's work 1s perce~ved as havlng economic value. Thus In both rlch and poor countrles, women's partic~pat~on the household In work outs~de can Improve the~r status w~t h~n the family, but t h s IS not necessarily assured. It IS lnterestlng to compare Barbara Bergmann's (1986) analys~s of the sltuatlon of "drudge w~ves" In the Unlted States, who work full-tlme for pay and who also perform virtually all of the household's unpa~d labor, w~t h Peggy Sanday's earlier finding that, In some Th~rd World contexts, women who do little of the work that 1s cons~dered "product~ve" have low status, whereas many who do a great deal of ~t become "vlrtual slaves" (Sanday 1974 , p. 201, Bergmann 1986 ' Thls leads us to the Issue of women's economlc dependence (actual and perce~ved). Although most poor women In poor countrles work long hours each day, throughout the world they are often economcally dependent on men. T h~s , too, IS "s~milar to but worse than" the sltuatlon of many women In rlcher countrles. It results from so much of thelr work belng unpa~d work, so much of the~r p a~d work belng poorly p a~d work, and, In some cases, from men's laylng clalm to the wages thew wlves and daughters earn. Fernlnlst cntics slnce Ester Boserup (1970) have argued that women's economc dependency on men was In many cases exacerbated by changes that devel-opment theory and development policymakers saw only as "progress~ve." All too ready to percelve women as dependents, mainstream theor~sts did not notice that technology, geographical mobility, and the conversion from subs~stence to market economies were not, from the female polnt of vlew, "unalloyed benefits, but processes that cut women out from thelr traditional economlc and soclal roles and thrust them Into the modern sector where they are discnm~nated agalnst and explo~ted, often recelvlng cash Incomes below the subslstence level,
In turn ~ncreas(ing) female dependency" (Jaquette 1982; see also Boserup 1970; Rogers, In Jaquette) . ' In both r~c h and poor countrles, women who are the sole economlc support of families often face particular hardstup. However, whereas some are, not all of the reasons for ttus are the same. Discr~rmnation agalnst women In access to jobs, pay, retention, and promotion are common to most countrles, w~t h obv~ously deleter~ous effects on female-supported families. In the Un~ted States, the average full-t~me worlung woman earns a little more than two-tlurds of the pay of a full-t~me male worker, and three-fifths of the families w~t h children who live In chron~c poverty are slngle female-parent families. Many such women In both nch and poor countrles also suffer from severe "time poverty." But the sltuatlon of some poor women In poor countrles 1s different from-as well as distinctly worse than-that of most Western women today. It IS more like the s~tuation of the latter In the nineteenth century even when they have no other means of support, they are actually prohibited (by relig~ously based laws or oppresslve cultural norms) from engaglng In p a~d labor. Martha Chen (forthcom~ng) has studied closely the sltuatlon of such women In the Indian subcontinent. Depr~ved of the traditional economc support of a male, they are prevented from taklng p a~d employment by rules of caste, orpurdah. For such women, ~t can Indeed be liberating to be helped (as they have been by outs~ders like Chen) to reslst the sanctions Invoked agalnst them by family elders, ne~ghbors, or powerful soc~al leaders. Although many forms of wage work, espec~ally those available to women, are hardly "liberating," except In the most baslc sense, women are surely dist~nctly less free ~f they are not allowed to engage In ~t , espec~ally ~f they have no other means of support. Many employed women In Western lndustnalized countnes still face qulte serlous disapproval if they are mothers of young children or ~f the family's need for then wages IS not perce~ved as great. But at least, except in the most oppresslve of families or subcultures, they are allowed to go out to work. By contrast, as Chen's work makes clear, the bas~c r~ght to be allowed to make a much needed livlng for themselves and theu children 1s still one that many women In the poorest of sltuatlons In other cultures are denled.
Here, then, 1s a real difference-an oppressive sltuatlon that most Western women no longer face. But to return to s~milar~t~es: another that I discovered, while comparing some of our Western femln~st Ideas about justice w~t h work on poor women In poor countrles, has to do w~t h the dynamcs of power w~thln the family. The different~al exlt potent~al theory that I adopt from Albert Hirschman's work to explain power w~thln the family has recently been applied to the sltuatlon of women In poor countrles (cf. Okln 1989b, chap. 7 w~t h Dasgupta 1993 and Sen 1990b) . Partha Dasgupta (1993) also uses exlt theory In explalnlng the "not uncommon" desertion by men of theu families durlng famlnes. He wrltes, "The man deserts [hls wife] because hrs outs~de option In these clrcumstances emerges hlgher In h~s ranlung than any feasible allocation w~thin the household" (p. 329). He regards the "hardware" he employs-John Nash's game-theoretic program-as "needed if we are to make any progress In what IS a profoundly complex matter, the understanding of household dec~sions" (p. 329). But the conclus~on he reaches 1s very slrnilar to the one that I reach, drawlng on Hirschman's theory of power and the effects of persons' differential exlt potent~al: any factor that lmproves the husband's exlt optlon or detracts from the wife's exlt optlon thereby glves h~m addit~onal voice, or barga~nlng power in the relationshp. Likew~se, anythlng that lmproves the wife's exlt opt~on-her acqu~s~tion of human or physlcal cap~tal, for example-will increase her autonomy and place her In a better bargalnlng positlon in the relat~onsh~p (Dasgupta 1993,331-33; Okln 1989b, chap. 7) .1°
In the Un~ted States, recent research has shown that women's and children's economc status (talung need Into account) typically deteriorates after separat~on or divorce, whereas the average divorcing man's economlc status actually lmproves (McLlndon 1987; We~tzman 1985; Wishik 1986 ). This, taken In conjunction with the exitlvo~ce theory, Implies less bargalnlng power for wlves within marrlage. In poor countrles, where clrcumstances of severe poverty comblne w~t h a lack of paid employment opportunities for women, lncreaslng women's dependency on men, men's power within the family-already In most cases leg~tlm~zed by hlghly patr~archal cultural norms-seems very likely to be enhanced. Although, as Dasgupta (1993) polnts out, Nash's formula was not Intended as a normat~ve theory, employed In thls context, the theory not only explarns (much as does my employment of Hirschman's theory) the cyclical nature of women's lack of power w~thln the family. It also po~nts to the lnjustlce of a situation in wh~ch the assumption of women's responsibility for children, thelr disadvantaged position in the p a d workforce, and the~r physlcal vulnerability to male v~olence all contribute to giving them little barga~nlng room when their (or their children's) Interests conflict with those of the men they live w~th, thereby In turn worsening the~r posltlon relative to that of men. The whole theory, then, whether In ~t s more or ~t s less mathematical form, seemsjust as applicable to the s~tuations of very poor women In poor countnes as ~t1s to women In qulte well-off households I n nch countrles. Indeed, one must surely say, In thls case, too, "slrnilar but much worse," for the stakes are undeniably h~gher-no less than life or death for more than a hundred million women, as has recently been shown (Drkze and Sen 1990, chap. 4; Sen 1990a) .
Policy Implications
Some of the solutions to all these problems, whlch have been suggested recently by scholars addresung the sltuatlon of poor women In poor countries, closely resemble solut~ons proposed by Western fermn~sts pnmarily concentrating on their own socletles. (By "solutions to problems" I mean to refer to both what theonsts and soc~al sclentlsts need to do to rect~fy thew analyses and what policymakers need to do to solve the soc~al problems themselves.) First, the dichotom~zat~on of public and domestic spheres must be strongly challenged. As Chen (1983) wrltes, In the context of poor rural reglons, "So long as policy-makers make the artificial distinction between the farm and the household, between pa~d work and unpald work, between productive and domest~c work, women will contlnue to be overlooked" (p. 220). Challenging the dichotomy will also polnt attention to the lnequlties that occur w~t h n households-var~ous forms of abuse, Including the lnequltable distribution of food and health care. As Papanek (1 990) argues, "Given a focus on socialization for Inequality, power relations wlthln the householdas a central theme In examlnlng the dynamlcs of households-deserve specla1 attention" @. 170).
Second, and following from the above, the unlt of analys~s both for studies and for much policy-malung must be the lndiv~dual, not the household." Noting that, glven the greater political volce of men, public decls~ons affecting the poor In poor countnes are often "gu~ded by male preferences, not [frequently conflict~ng] female needs," Dasgupta (1993) concludes that the mrwrmzation of well-be~ng as a model for explillrung household behav~our must be rejected.
Even though it 1s often difficult to des~gn and effect it, the target of public policy should be persons, not households.
Governments need to be conscious of the household as a resource allocation mechan~sm. Espec~allyas women are even more likely In poor countrles than In r~cher ones to be prov~ding the sole or prlnc~pal support for thelr households, as Chen (1983) polnts out, they requlre as much access as men to credit, skills tralnlng, labor markets, and technologies (and, I would add, equal pay for theu work) (p. 221). Polic~es prompting women's full economlc partic~patlon and product~v~ty households, are needed lncreaslngly for the surv~val of the~r for women's overall socloeconomlc status, and for the~r bargalnlng posltlon w~thln thelr families. As Drhze and Sen (1989) say, "important policy ~mplications" follow from the "cons~derable ev~dence that greater involvement w~t h outs~de work and p a~d employment does tend to go w~t h less anti-female blas In ~ntra-family distribut~on" (p. 58). Because of the qulte pervasive unequal treatment of female children In some poor countries, the need for equal treatment of women by policymakers 1s often far more urgent than the need of most women In r~cher countr~es-but agaln, the Issue 1s not so much different as "s~rnilar but more so."
IMPLICATIONS FOR THINKING ABOUTJUSTICE
Finally, I shall speculate br~efly about two different ways of ttunlung about justlce between the sexes, In cultures very different from ours. I have tned to show that, for femlnlsts ttunlung about justlce, John Rawls's theory, if revlsed so as to Include women and the family, has a great deal to be s a~d for ~t , and the veil of Ignorance is particularly Important (Rawls 1971 , Okln 1989a , 1989b . If everyone were to speak only from hls or her own polnt of vlew, ~t 1s unclear that we would come up wlth any prlnc~ples at all. But the very presence of the veil, whlch hldes from those In the or~glnal posltlon any particular knowledge of the personal characterlstlcs or soc~al posltion they will have In the soclety for whlch they are d e s~g n~n g prlnc~ples of Justlce, forces them to take Into account as many volces as possible and especlally to be concerned w~t h those of the least well-off. It enables us to reconcile the requlrement that a theory of justlce be un~versalizable w~t h the seemingly conflicting requlrement that it take account of the mult~ple differences among human belngs.
In a recent paper, Ruth Anna Putnam (forthcoming), argulng a strongly ant~essent~alist line, and accuslng Rawls and myself of varylng degrees of exclus~onary essent~alism, cons~ders Instead an "interact~ve" (some might call ~t "dialoglc") femlnlsm: "that we listen to the volces of women of color and women of a different class, and that we appropriate what we hear" (p. 21).12Listening and discussing have much to recommend them; they are fundamental to democracy In the best sense of the word. And sometlnles when especlally oppressed women are heard, then cry for justlce I S clear-as in the case of the women Martha Chen worked with, who became qulte clear that belng allowed to leave the domest~c sphere In order to earn wages would help to liberate them. But we are not always enlightened about what 1s just by asklng persons who seem to be sufYenng injustices what they want. Oppressed people have often Internalized then oppression so well that they have no sense of what they are justly entltled to as human belngs. T h~s 1s certainly the case w~t h gender ~nequalit~es. As Papanek (1990) wrltes, "The clear perception of disadvantages requlres conscious rejection of the soc~al norms and cultural Ideal that perpetuate Inequalities and the use of different cr~tena-perhaps from another actual or Idealized soclety-ln order to assess Inequality as a prelude for act~on" (pp. 164-65).People In ser~ously deprlved condit~ons are sometimes not only accepting of them but relat~vely cheerful-the "small merc~es" sltuatlon. Depr~vations sometimes become gagged and muffled for reasons of deeply rooted ~deology, among others. But ~t would surely be eth~cally deeply mlstaken to attach a correspondingly small value to the loss of well-being of such people because of theu surv~val strategy.
Comlng to terms w~t h very little 1s no reclpe for soc~al justice. Thus ~t IS, I believe, qulte justifiable for those not thoroughly Imbued w~t h the Inegalitar~annorms of a culture to come forth as ~t s constructlve crltlcs. Crltical distance, after all, does not have to bnng w~t h ~t detachment: commrtred outs~ders can often be better analysts and cr~tics of soc~al Injustice than those who live w~thln the relevant culture. This IS why a concept such as the orlglnal posltlon, whlch alms to approxlmate an Arch~medean pant, rs so valuable, at least In addit~on to some form of dialogue. Let us thlnk for a moment about some of the cruelest or most oppressive Institutions and practices that are or have been used to "brand" women-foot blnding, clitor~dectomy, and purdah. As Papanek shows, "well soc~alized" women In cultures wlth such pract~ces Internalize them as necessary to successful female development. Even though, In the case of the former two practices, these women may retaln v~v~d memones of the~r own Intense paln, they perpetuate the cruelties, Inflicting them or at least allowlng them to be Inflicted on thelr own daughters. Now, clearly, a theory of human flour~sh~ng, such as Nussbaum and Sen have been developing, would have no trouble deleg~tlm~zlng such practices (Nussbaum 1992) . But glven the cho~ce between a rev~sed Rawls~an outlook or an "interactive fermnlst" one, as defined by Putnam, I'd choose the former any day, for In the latter, well-soc~alized members of the oppressed group are all too likely to rat~onalize the cruelties, whereas the men who percelve themselves as benefiting from them are unlikely to object. But behlnd the veil of ignorance, 1s ~t not much more likely that both the oppressors and the oppressed would have second thoughts? What Moslem man 1s likely to take the chance of spending h s life In seclus~on and dependency, sweltenng In head-to-toe solid black cloth~ng? What prerevolut~onary Chlnese man would cast h~s vote for the breaklng of toes and hobbling through life, if he well rmght be the one w~t h the toes and the cnppled life? What man would endorse gross genital mutilation, not knowing whose gen~tals? And the women In these cultures, requ~red to th~nk of such practices from a male as well as a female perspective, m~g h t thereby, w~t h a little distance, galn more notion of just how, rather than perfecting femlninlty, they perpetuate the subordination of women to men.
Martha Nussbaum (1992) As Nussbaum later concludes, "Identification need not Ignore concrete local differences: In fact, at ~t s best, ~t demands a searching analys~s of differences, In order that the general good be appropnately realized In the concrete case. But the learnlng about and from the other 1s motivated by the conviction that the other 1s one of us" (p. 241).
As the work of some f e m~n~s t scholars of development shows, uslng the concept of gender and refus~ng to let differences gag us or fragment our analyses does not mean that we should overgeneralize or try to apply "standardized" solutions to the problems of women In different clrcumstances. Chen argues for the value of a s~tuation-by-s~tuat~on analys~s of women's roles and constraints before plans can be made and programs des~gned. And Papanek, too, shows how helplng to educate women to awareness of their oppression requlres qulte deep and spec~fic knowledge of the relevant culture.
Thus I conclude that gender itself 1s an extremely Important category of analys~s and that we ought not be paralyzed by the fact that there are differences among women. So long as we are careful and develop our judgments In the light of emplr~cal ev~dence, ~t 1s possible to generalize about many aspects of inequality between the sexes. Theor~es developed In Western contexts can clearly apply, at least in large part, to women In very different cultural contexts. From place to place, from class to class, from race to race, and from culture to culture, we find slmilanhes in the specifics of these ~nequalitles, in thelr causes and thelr effects, although often not In the~r extent or severity.
NOTES
1. T h~s debate has been conducted mostly among femlnlst legal and political theonsts. The legal literature 1s already so vast that it IS difficult to surnmanze, and ~t IS not relevant to t h s essay. For some references, see O k~n (1991), ns. 1-3.
2. "Essentialism," employed In the context of fernrust theory, seems to have two pnnc~pal meancngs. The other refers to the tendency to regard c e m n charactenstics or capac~ties as "essentially" female, In the sense that they are unalterably assoc~ated w~t h be~ng female. Used In t h~s second way, essentialism IS very close to, if not always Identical w~th, blolog~cal determ~n~sm.
aspect of the term here. I am not concerned w~th t h~s 3. In 1851, at an almost entirely white women's nghts convention, Truth sa~d, That man over there says women need to be helped Into carnages, and lifted over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever helps me Into carnages, or over mud puddles, or glves me any best place! And iun't I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm! I have ploughed, and planted, and gathered Into barns, and no man could head me! And a~n't I a woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man-when I could get it-and bear the lash as well! And iun't I a woman? I have borne th~rteen children, and seen most all sold off to slavery, and when I cned out w~th my mother's gnef, none but Jesus heard me! And iun't I a woman? 4. The example 1s that of the many black women (and few whte women) who answered Joann L~ttle's appeal on behalf of Delbert Tibbs, a black man who had been falsely accused of raplng a white woman and sentenced todeath. I do not tlunk the exampleclearly supports Hams's assertion that black women have "a umque amb~valence" about rape, any more than ~t suppoxts the assertion she clams to refute--that then expenence 1s slrnilar, but different In magnitude. Black women's present expenence of rape IS surely s~milar to that of white women In several Important respects: many are raped (by acquiuntances as well as by strangers), they fear belng raped, they sometimes modify theu behav~or because of t h~s fear, and they are v~ctirmzed as witnesses at the tnals of thelr raplsts. But the~r expenence 1s probably also worse because, In addition to all of thls, they have to live w~t h the knowledge and expenence of black men's belng vlctirmzed by false accusations, harsher sentences, and, at worst, lynchngs. Only emp~ncal research that ~nvolved asklng them could show more certiunly whether the oppression of black men as alleged rapists (or the hstory of master/slave rape, whtch Hams also discusses) makes black women's entire contemporary expenence of rape different from that of white women.
5. However, thedetailed divis~on of labor between the sexes vanes cons~derably from culture to culture. As JaneMansbndge(l993) has recently wntten, ~nadiscuss~onof"gratu~tousgendenng" Among the Aleut of North Amenu, for example, only women are allowed to butcher an~mals. But among the Ingalik of North Amenca, only men are allowed to butcher anlmals. Among the Suku of Afnca, only the women can plant crops and only the rnen can make baskets. But among the Kaffa of the Circum-Mediterranean, only the men can plant crops and only the women can make baskets. (P. 345)
Her analys~s 1s denved from data In George P Murdoch and Catenna Provost, "Factors In the Divlslon of Labor by Sex: A Cross-Cultural Analysis," Ethnology 12 (1973): 203-25. However, the work done by women IS less likely to be "outside" work and to be pad or valued.
6. Poverty IS both a relative and an absolute term. The poorest households In poor countnes are absolutely as well as relatively poor and can be easily pushed below subsistence by any number of natural, soclal, or personal catastrophes. Poverty In rlch countnes 1s more often relatlve poverty (although there IS senous tnalnutrit~on currently In the United States for example, and drug abuse, wlth all ~t s related ills, 1s h~ghly correlated with poverty). Relative poverty, although not directly life-threatening, can however be very panful, especlally for children livlng In societies that are not only hghly consumer-onented but In whch many opportunities-for good health care, decent education, the development of talents, pursult of Interests, and so on-are senously limited for those from poor families. Single parents also often expenence severe "tlme poverty," wh~ch can have a senous Impact on thelr children's wellbeing.
7. See Dasgupta (1993) on members' perceived "usefulness" affecting the allocation of goods wlthln poor households In poor families. Western studies as well as non-western ones show us that women's work 1s already likely to be regarded as less useful--even when it 1s just as necessary to family well-belng. So when women are really made less useful (by convention or lack of employment opportunlties), t h s problem 1s compounded. Dasgupta questions slniple measures of usefulness, such as pad employment, In the case of gtrls (1993) . Where young poor women are not entitled to parental assets and thelroutslde employment opportunlties are severely restncted, the only significant "employment" for then 1s as childbearers and housekeepers-so mamage becomes especlally valued (even though ~t s conditions may be hlghly oppressive). 8. There seems to be some conflicting evldence on thls matter. See Papanek (1990, 166-68) . 9.This seems similar to changes tn the work and socloeconomlc status of women In Western Europe In the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. 10. 1 do not mean to Imply here that most women, whether In developed or less developed socletles, thnk about lmprovlng thelr exlt optlons when maklng decisions about wage work and related issues. Indeed, In some cultures, women relinquish wage work as soon as their families' financial situation enable them to do so. But thelr exit option IS nevertheless reduced, and thelr partner's enhanced, thereby In all likelihood altenng the distribution of power withn the family.
11. This polnt seems to have been first explicitly made in the context of policy by George Bernard Shaw, who argues in The lntelligerlt Womun :r Gurde to Socialism and Capitalism (New Brunsw~ck, NJ: Transact~on Books, 1984) that the state should requlre all adults to work and should allocate an equal portion of income to e a c L m a n , woman, and child.
12.As Joan Tronto has polnted out to me, the use of "appropriate" here 1s noteworthy, glven Putnam's professed deslre to treat these other women as her equals.
